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SUMMARY 
Hungary made big efforts in the 1990s 
to carry out the tasks of transition to a 
market economy. The economy was place 
on market footing. Legislative frames 
were created, freedom of enterprise 
guaranteed, trade and capital flows lib-
eralized, the state sector largely privat-
ized, and state intervention through di-
rect subsidies substantially curtailed. 
The state was in the process of 
withdrawing from economic activity. This 
was also expressed in the lack or slow 
development of an industrial policy con-
cept. Industrial policy (and use of state 
aid) was targeted mainly at investment, 
especially foreign investment. The under-
lying concept was that investment deci-
sions might enjoy general support, while 
picking winners was left to the market 
and entrepreneurs. State aid mainly took 
the form of tax holidays, not direct 
money transfers. Since conditions for 
these were strict (with size thresholds, 
sectoral and employment preferences, 
etc.) most of those qualifying were for-
eign investors.  
This aid policy seems to have been 
successful, as large amounts of invest-
ment capital poured into Hungary in the 
1990s and contributed to a substantial 
increase in manufacturing competitive-
ness. On the other hand, the indirect 
aim of governments to channel invest-
ment towards high-technology sectors 
succeeded only in part. In some cases, 
sectoral preferences were met by inves-
tors in a statistical sense, but the activity 
they pursued in Hungary was not at the 
desired high technological level. By the 
end of the 1990s, the country’s capacity 
to attract capital had been exhausted for 
the prevailing activity structure and fur-
ther investment could be absorbed only 
in industries using a skilled labour force. 
The aid policy was not efficient in chan-
nelling investment in this direction. 
Another important conclusion is 
that a tax holiday-dominated policy on 
state aid can distort the statistical over-
view of state aid. Since Hungary became 
a tax heaven in the 1990s, many multi-
national corporations channelled world-
wide profits to this country to save prof-
its tax on activities in other countries 
too. Thus the ‘state aid’ from Hungarian 
governments was to some extent paid 
effectively by other countries but realized 
in Hungary. That is mainly why Hungary 
showed a relatively high state aid/GDP 
ratio in international statistics. It would 
be worth continuing research into this 
topic, as calculations could also reveal 
the effective unintended subsidization of 
other countries. Furthermore, Hungary’s 
entry into the EU changes the picture, as 
tax holidays will soon end, with impor-
tant effects on Hungarian aid policy and 
other countries’ positions.  
The other main line of state aid 
was open and covert cash subsidization 
of sensitive industries and single firms. 
This was important in the 1990s, mainly 
in the state-owned sector, but as privati-
zation neared completion, the importance 
of cash transfers declined. The last major 
pre-privatization bail-out occurred in 
2001, when the final major Hungarian 
commercial bank in state hands Posta-
bank was rescued and then successfully 
privatized. Nevertheless, there seem to be 
problems with the figures in this regard 
too, as most subsidies went to economic 
agents through indirect channels, via the 
ÁPV, the Hungarian Development Bank, 
various development funds held by the 
Government (lately by the Office of the 
Prime Minister), or even by ministries. 
Official statistics for state aid in the 
1990s are hardly reliable, due to lack of 
transparency in the state sector. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
The purpose of this paper is to describe 
the aid policies of the Hungarian state. 
Subsidy is an important policy tool for 
several purposes, including support for 
structural change in the economy, which 
is an important goal of industrial policy. 
For competitiveness, equal importance 
attaches to supporting development of 
competitive activities and revival of un-
competitive ones. The state has been 
playing a crucial role in both in Hun-
gary, although the emphasis has shifted 
from reorganization to promotion. How-
ever, general levels of state aid have de-
clined and the structure changed, with a 
gradual change in the tools applied to-
wards those used and recommended by 
the EU. This has brought major changes 
in the content of aid activity and in re-
porting and statistical measurement of it. 
Thus the figures for 1990–95 are differ-
ent in content and methodology from 
later data. 
The paper sets out to analyse the 
impact of state subsidy on manufactur-
ing competitiveness. The totality of state 
aid is not considered; an outline of the 
figures for state aid is followed by de-
tailed analysis for manufacturing, but 
not for mining, transport or agriculture, 
for example. To show the general 
framework of state subsidization of 
manufacturing in Hungary, a brief de-
scription of the development of industrial 
policy is provided first. Industrial policy 
has determined the development tasks 
that were supported by state aid. This 
part is followed by the analysis of state 
aid. The analysis is divided into two pe-
riods, up to and since 1995. The statis-
                                                 
* Paper prepared for the EU Fifth Framework 
Project: ‘Changes in Industrial Competitiveness as 
a Factor of Integration: Identifying Challenges of 
the Enlarged Single European Market’ (Contract 
No.: HPSE-CT-2002-00148). 
tics are assessed, including their content 
and reliability. The role of extra-
budgetary institutions is discussed in 
some detail. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY CONCEPTS 
AFTER 1990 
The first, 1990–95 period of ‘creative 
destruction’ in the Hungarian transition 
produced three different industrial policy 
concepts (see OECD 1995). The first cov-
ered the requirements of market-
institution development and emphasized 
the end to previous industrial-policy 
practice a tool of the command econ-
omy. With underdeveloped institutions 
and Comecon still operating, no strategic 
vision was developed in 1990. The 
document tried to define the role of in-
dustrial policy within the frames of a 
market economy. Although a shift in EU 
practice towards active development pol-
icy had begun, no explicit EU-compatible 
industrial policy was implemented at that 
time. The emphasis was on negative list-
ing of what industrial policy should not 
do in a transforming Hungary. Nor did 
the policy document define specific 
measures of industrial policy.  
Within a year or so, it emerged 
that the transition was bound to bring 
significant structural changes in the 
economy. Most importantly, a severe 
contraction and downsizing process 
started, which could not simply be con-
doned by the government. Other big 
changes in the economy likewise required 
a clear government position and some-
times intervention, for which a clear pol-
icy concept was needed. Such issues in-
cluded trade liberalization, market regu-
lation, privatization and deregulation. A 
new policy outline was developed in late 
1992 and implemented in early 1993. 
This concept was designed for the 
medium term. It described the potential 
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variety of policy measures to enhance 
corporate adjustment without risking a 
return of excessive intervention. The 
document also contained a foresight 
model of Hungarian industrial develop-
ment, on which suggestions for policy 
goals and tools were based. The progno-
sis proved largely correct, at least for 
the advance of economic recovery and 
growth resumption by main industries, 
but it did not envisage the ongoing crisis 
in several industries, or the concurrent 
presence of tardy and successful busi-
nesses in the same industries (dual struc-
ture). Unlike the first concept, the second 
did not rely greatly on ownership 
changes as a panacea. It introduced the 
possibility of ‘crisis management’ support 
for some state-owned firms of strategic 
importance (the dirty dozen). 
Crisis management included directly 
and indirectly subsidizing 12 (later 15) 
firms. Török (1997) estimated the total 
cost of these measures to USD 1.5 bil-
lion. This included direct cash transfers 
from various sources (central budget 
funds; the State Property Agency as 
ownership representative), write-offs of 
payment arrears (taxes; health-service 
contributions; banks and commercial 
creditors, at least partly using state 
funds), development and restructuring 
funds (payments for reorganization in-
vestment, technology updating, etc.) Half 
the affected firms survived and were 
privatized. Others were sold piecemeal. 
Some parts remained in indirect state 
ownership, joining the portfolio of the 
state-owned Hungarian Development 
Bank and its successors. 
Crisis management became an im-
portant area of industrial policy and 
remained so later. Indirect asset man-
agement was still carried out through 
state-owned mediators. The portfolio in-
creased and changed, as some private or 
privatized firms that failed ended up 
with these ‘development agencies’. The 
biggest increase in volume was achieved 
with two waves of corporate and bank 
consolidation affecting about 150 compa-
nies. The emphasis had therefore shifted 
in the second industrial-policy concept 
from following strategic development tar-
gets to state crisis management. Long-
term structural policy lacked funding 
and energy, however (see Szanyi 1996).   
The third industrial-policy concept, 
developed in 1995, was based on a 
more specific vision, with a strategic 
background of EU accession require-
ments. It contained a detailed system of 
promotion tools and a set of EU-
compatible development goals. The major 
tools were orientation and support of R 
and D, support for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), regional policy, 
and in exchange for ‘targeted’ prefer-
ences for FDI projects, a normative sys-
tem of investment promotion. The prime 
objective was to enhance long-term eco-
nomic competitiveness. This goal has re-
mained, despite various changes of con-
cept. It was also in line with EU policy 
guidelines, which had been formulated 
explicitly by then. The goals and tools 
were coordinated with EU competition-
policy requirements and did not inter-
vene to conserve failed industrial struc-
tures. 
Both the second and third concepts 
held sectoral preferences that changed 
over time. The second concept’s prefer-
ence was exemplified by the companies 
chosen for crisis management, which 
were in the automotive, electrical-
appliance and chemical industries. But 
crisis management of a few large firms 
did not involve implementing a thor-
oughly developed concept of sectoral re-
structuring. Preference was given to 
some former flagship companies in Hun-
garian manufacturing and to other firms 
for regional employment reasons. The 
shift showed clearly in the increase from 
12 to 15 recipient firms and the inclu-
sion of metallurgical companies. The use 
of state subsidy in crisis management 
varied between firms according to 
whether decline or expansion was ex-
pected. As Szalavetz (2003) pointed out, 
support for growing and declining in-
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dustries required different policy tools, 
whose efficiency was reduced because 
differing industries were placed in the 
same framework. Szanyi (1996) reported 
that 5–6 of the 15 were effectively bailed 
out, another 4–5 showed reduced or 
substantially changed activity, and 4 
made an exit.  
The 1995 concept used different 
sectoral preferences. Instead of crisis 
management, the leitmotif was to im-
prove competitiveness, although this did 
not mean an end to crisis management 
or even direct subsidization of a number 
of ailing companies, as happened in the 
steel industry, for example. The major 
change was that state ownership became 
indirect and money transfers flowed 
through state-owned ‘development agen-
cies’, not directly from the state budget. 
This resembled the practice of the con-
solidation banks in the Czech Republic. 
Most of the 1995 concept’s real devel-
opments were applied generally, but 
some assertive development paths were 
given official preference. These industries 
had attracted FDI and the policy concept 
sought to rely on such investment and 
enhance its spillover effects. Thus the 
automotive and electronics industries, 
software development and some chemical 
segments became prime targets. 
The problem was that industrial 
policy had very few active tools to en-
hance structural changes, due to major 
macroeconomic imbalances. The most ef-
fective were fiscal incentives and in some 
cases contributions in kind, such as free 
transfers of industrial premises. SME de-
velopment, as another industrial policy 
tool, involved minor amounts in the form 
of preferential credit schemes and guar-
antees. After 1994, the SME sector did 
not receive any fiscal incentives (tax 
preferences or cash subsidies). Regional 
and structural policy (in the EU manner) 
mainly affected foreign investments. Cen-
tral development funds were used for 
projects that reached a threshold level in 
terms of job creation, R and D spend-
ing, export performance, further invest-
ments and turnover growth. Local- gov-
ernment tools were also used to attract 
large investments. 
MITT (1997), an official document, 
stressed these priorities in industrial pol-
icy: 
* Priority for accelerating industrial re-
structuring, to promote competitive 
structures. 
* Increasing harmonization of industrial-
policy instruments with the require-
ments arising from Hungary’s interna-
tional commitments. 
* Tackling major industrial-development 
tasks such as concluding privatization, 
restructuring sensitive industries, sup-
port for FDI, harmonization of infra-
structural developments, regional de-
velopment strategy, and export 
growth. 
* Tasks related to legal harmonization 
and cooperation. 
It designated as key areas stimula-
tion of investment (in general, but most 
importantly, FDI), supporting corporate R 
and D and innovation, developing sup-
plier networks to foreign firms, and 
raising exports. The most effective indus-
trial policy (and FDI attraction tools) in 
the period were fiscal incentives and in-
dustrial free-trade zones. 
A fourth and most recent develop-
ment in industrial policy occurred with 
the preparation of the National Develop-
ment Plan, and its predecessor the Szé-
chenyi Plan in 2000. The Széchenyi Plan 
was a logical continuation or updating 
of the third concept. It developed further 
the range of industrial-policy tools in 
harmony with international obligations 
and with the expected EU requirements 
for the accession talks. In fact, the tools 
underwent continual change during the 
accession process, the last major revisions 
being made in 2002 (lifting of tax sub-
sidies and withdrawal of industrial free-
trade zones). This harmonization process 
necessarily meant a steady contraction in 
direct state subsidies. The indirect forms 
of subsidy through state-controlled 
development agencies remained in place, 
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opment agencies remained in place, and 
so did large subsidies to some major 
state-owned enterprises such as Hungar-
ian State Railways and Malév Hungarian 
Airlines. The last major bank consolida-
tion procedure, for the Postabank, was 
carried out and the bank sold to foreign 
investors in 2003. The new terminology 
to cover subsidies is ‘state venture-capital 
funding’, which has nothing in common 
with traditional venture-capitalist activity.  
The Széchenyi Plan and Hungarian 
Development Plan developed further the 
concept of FDI-based development. It ef-
fectively continued large-scale investment, 
although rather limited funds for SME 
and tourism development were included. 
The most interesting innovation was sup-
port for FDI spillover effects by various 
means. An FDI supplier-network creation 
programme was introduced, as well as 
support for the creation of industrial 
parks, especially those with some R and 
D or innovation activity. This latter topic 
was also supported by other tools, like a 
cluster programme of support for coop-
eration among big business, research in-
stitutions and higher education. Emphasis 
on innovation and the requirements of a 
knowledge-based economy marks the 
whole document (Csillag 2003), for ex-
ample parts dealing with development of 
human resources, infrastructure systems 
etc. The predominance of future-oriented 
development tasks was clear compared 
with the crisis management pervading 
previous policy concepts. 
Industrial development practice is 
analysed in Tétényi (2000), with a view 
to EU accession requirements. This tech-
nical paper is very critical of the devel-
opment focuses and practice before the 
advent of the Széchenyi Plan (the third 
concept). Even if the previous concepts 
are seen as steps in an iterative concept-
development process, the criticism seems 
correct. Tétényi (2000) says that the 
structural development of the Hungarian 
economy was largely a result of capital 
imports (FDI) and economic crises 
(downsizing, liquidation), rather than of 
active industrial policy, with clearly po-
litical overtones in a number of policy 
measures. Policy-makers were much 
against planning and direct support. The 
campaigns of withdrawal by the state 
from business resulted in an abrupt 
drop in state-budget financed investment. 
State ‘investment’ was partly channelled 
into covert forms, such as the develop-
ment agencies. This decentralization of 
state spending decreased the efficiency of 
the tools. As Tétényi puts it, ‘This ineffi-
cient structure was even supported with 
the ideological argument that “private 
use” of capital meant greater efficiency.’ 
This indirect, decentralized and some-
times spontaneous means of state devel-
opment promotion is regarded by Tétényi 
as an inferior method of capital utiliza-
tion. On the other hand, he foresees a 
new, transparent, effective, EU-compatible 
system of structural policy, planning and 
resource allocation. 
Nikodemus et. al. (2000) also stress 
that Hungarian planning practice and 
preparation of the National Development 
Plan were inadequate. They argue that 
given the time limit (submission of the 
plan to the EU Commission was due one 
year before accession), the NDP was at 
a very immature phase. Much of the 
decimated planning capacity was charged 
with preparing the Broad Development 
Plan and not much time was devoted to 
the details. Even the creation of regions 
(instead of the existing counties as sec-
ond-tier local-government units) was not 
completed by 2000, let alone the re-
gional development proposals. And what 
was ready was substandard in many re-
spects – very much the result of con-
flicts in the earlier, partly communist-
inherited planning regime and the EU-
compatible task and indicator-oriented 
planning methods. The Széchenyi Plan, 
and later the National Development Plan, 
tried to bridge this methodological gap. 
The current version of the Széc-
henyi Plan includes two main pillars. The 
first is a remnant of the previous fiscal-
incentive system for FDI, the Smart Hun-
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gary programme. Investment promotion 
now accords with EU practice, tax incen-
tives being used for regional develop-
ment, R and D, and adult education, 
with a possible tax-free reserve for de-
velopment. There is also some direct 
support for creating business locations, 
supporting the establishment of regional 
corporate centres, and competitive and 
environment-friendly investment support. 
The total allocated to the Smart Hungary 
programme is very limited, as are its 
tasks. The other pillar is the Széchenyi 
Enterprise Development Programme for 
supporting SMEs. This contains free 
transfer of knowledge on the EU, sup-
port for competitiveness-enhancing pro-
jects and preferential credit schemes. The 
total budget for the two projects is 
about 600 million Euros (Szalay-
Berzeviczy 2003). 
The support of industrial parks, 
and clusters are two important, relatively 
new elements of the Széchenyi Plan. They 
seem to be suitable for several purposes. 
First, they are EU conform regional de-
velopment tools. Second, they focus on 
the establishment of cooperation between 
FDI and Hungarian business. Third, they 
have a clear technology transfer and in-
novation content. Fourth, clusters also 
include a broad spectrum of business 
and society, it is not only business coop-
eration. Clusters and industrial parks 
may receive funding from the central 
budget, but also from local governments, 
and later probably also from EU funds 
(Nikodemus and Gecse 2002). They may 
even have some sectoral preferences 
(technology intensive activities). On the 
other hand, as Szalavetz (2003) points 
out, some of the successful economic 
clusters contributed to the diffusion of 
high technology rather in mature indus-
tries, and became this way part of the 
management of sensitive industries.  
In this sense, a basic conceptual 
change should be made: technological 
renewal of sensitive industries inevitably 
leads to further job losses as new tech-
nologies save labour. Thus they can sup-
port competitiveness. Hungarian practice 
is in this sense rudimentary. Sensitive in-
dustries are not tackled by the National 
Development Plan and the practice of 
indirect state subsidization of a number 
of firms continues, mainly for employ-
ment reasons. Hungary lacks a concept 
for technological renewal of sensitive in-
dustries. 
STATE AID UP TO 1995 
Monitoring forms of state aid in Hun-
gary started in 1995, in accordance with 
Article 62 of the EU Association Agree-
ment. Regular reporting and adjustment 
of the subsidy system to EU practices 
started in 1996, the first year for which 
Hungarian statistics comparable with 
those of the EU statistics are available. 
However, they may have different con-
tent when subsidizing practice had not 
yet been adjusted to EU rules. For ex-
ample, Hungarian statistics included 
amounts of subsidized loans, while EU 
members registered only saved interest 
on these. Apart from the areas with 
some conceptual difference, Hungarian 
data was accepted and used by the EU 
authorities. The year 1996 was a turning 
point in other aspects of Hungary’s eco-
nomic development as well. It was the 
last year of massive direct state subsidy. 
State-assisted reorganization, recapitaliza-
tion of banks and other large-scale pro-
jects were completed. The practice with 
state aid moved irrevocably towards con-
formity with EU standards. 
However, subsidy reduction had 
begun before the 1989 change of eco-
nomic system, as the communist govern-
ment reduced several industrial and con-
sumer subsidies in the late 1980s. The 
decline in consumer price subsidies be-
gan to speed up in 1989, so that few 
other than for pharmaceuticals and pub-
lic transport remained by 1992. Mean-
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while the Antall and Boross governments 
(1990–94) continued to reduce subsidies 
to industry and agriculture, especially as 
trade destinations shifted from former 
Comecon countries to EU partners. An-
nual subsidy of all kinds as a proportion 
of GDP dropped steadily from 17.1 per 
cent in 1988 to 5.6 per cent in 1995 
(Table 1). 
The Antall, Boross and Horn 
(1994–8) governments granted substantial 
subsidies to state-owned banks during 
pre-privatization consolidation exercises, 
with the state taking over much bad 
debt. Although this bail-out did not fea-
ture in the current account, it was es-
sentially a subsidy. The government was 
contracting public debt in the form of 
Treasury bills so as to inject vast 
amounts of capital into the ailing banks. 
CEEBIC (1997) quotes István Csillag, then 
director of the Financial Research Insti-
tute (and currently minister for the 
economy) as saying that bank consolida-
tion in 1993–6 cost about USD 4 billion. 
Privatization of many manufacturers also 
involved indirect subsidies to improve 
their liquidity positions, cover the costs 
of environmental clean-up or serve other 
purposes. The main aid vehicle in the 
sector in those years was the state-
owned State Privatization and Asset 
Holding PLC.  
Since late 1995, continued privati-
zation in the energy, banking and manu-
facturing sectors has much reduced the 
subsidy commitments of the state. For 
example, privatization of over 70 per 
cent of the Hungarian energy sector led 
to a big saving in 
subsidies to energy 
producers and 
consumers. It took 
several more years 
to close down loss-
making coal-fired 
power plants and 
the mines serving 
them. (Closure of 
the last such col-
liery was an-
nounced just re-
cently.) Despite 
substantial in-
creases in con-
sumer energy 
prices in the last 10 years, prices are 
still lower than world levels. Foreign en-
ergy firms continue to seek price in-
creases to cover production costs plus 
the agreed 8 per cent profit margin.  
Hungarian governments in the 
1990s maintained steady levels of subsidy 
to agriculture and other rural activity. 
Of the USD 400–600 million total, more 
than half went to subsidize agricultural 
exports. This ceased in 2001, when 
Hungary’s agreement with the EU ex-
pired and the practice of EU-related ex-
port subsidies was discontinued prepara-
tory to EU accession. Agricultural export 
subsidies then gave way to rural devel-
opment subsidies for housing, road con-
struction and railway running costs.  
Although the level of state subsidy 
can be seen to have fallen substantially, 
post-1996 figures are not wholly compa-
rable with earlier data due to changing 
rules of spending and reporting. The 
data from 1996 onwards follow EU 
rules. For the purpose of comparison, we 
include here figures from Hungary’s 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) that do 
not conform with EU requirements, but 
Table 1 
State subsidy 
(USD billion) 
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Consumer subsidies 1.32 1.16 1.03 1.07 0.79 0.83 0.92 0.83 
Housing sector 0.62 1.46 1.66 1.26 1.29 1.01 0.90 0.95 
Producer subsidies, 
of which: 2.97 2.16 1.71 0.80 0.77 0.68 0.98 0.69 
• Agriculture 0.86 0.71 0.58 0.51 0.42 0.49 0.60 0.46 
• Railways 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.25 0.12 
Total including 
unlisted items 4.90 4.77 4.39 3.12 2.84 2.51 2.79 2.46 
Subsidies as propor-
tion of GDP 17.10 16.70 13.30 9.40 7.60 6.50 6.80 5.60 
Source: Ministry of Finance. In: CEEBIC 1997. 
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are more or less comparable with the 
data in the previous table. (However, 
they are not USD figures, and the total 
does not include other items than the 
first four rows.) Comparing these figures 
with those in Table 4, there is consider-
able consistency, so that there should not 
be major methodological differences in 
the EU rules and CSO methods. State aid 
paid to economic units seems to be very 
close in both tables. Other figures in the 
table also seem to be acceptably reliable. 
 
Table 2 shows that state subsidy 
had fallen by the second half of the 
1990s to a fairly stable level of under 3 
per cent of GDP (CSO classifications). 
The structure varied year by year, with 
agricultural aid especially volatile due to 
the sector’s special circumstances. 
STATE AID AFTER 1995 
Hungary had to provide the EU with 
annual data and information on state 
aid, under Article 62/4b of the EU As-
sociation Agreement. Reports were pre-
pared from 1996 using a developing in-
stitutional and methodological back-
ground. For example, local government 
aid practice was not included in the re-
ports until 1999. So the content of the 
figures changed over time, so that in-
creases in nominal figures may be due 
partly to inclusion of extra activities and 
amounts into the aggregates. Further-
more, differences remain between the 
Hungarian and EU reporting systems and 
resulting figures. There are also inconsis-
tencies between data in this paper and 
CSO data, since the CSO continues to 
gather by the old methodology. This sec-
tion uses data provided by the Aid Con-
trol Office (ACO) of the Ministry of Fi-
nance, which is largely compatible with 
EU methodology and better suited to the 
international comparison purposes of the 
competitiveness project. All data comes 
from TVI (2002), the last official report 
of the ACO. The analysis 
comes from there too and is 
only interpreted by the author.  
State aid is granted in 
Hungary for financing devel-
opment programmes and on 
an ad hoc basis. Ad hoc aid is 
channelled through specialized 
government agencies (mainly 
the State Privatization and As-
set Holding PLC and the Hun-
garian Development Bank). Direct ad hoc 
subsidies are on the decline, but this is 
partly affected also by problems of con-
solidating aid data. We return to this 
problem later. 
Eight chapters in the central budget 
are involved in distribution of state aid. 
Direct financial supports are obtained 
through the frameworks of ‘targeted al-
location funds’ (TAFs): the TAF for Eco-
nomic Development, the Central Basic 
Technological Programme, the TAF for 
Rural Development, the Labour Market 
Fund, the Regional Development TAF, the 
Tourism TAF, the Environmental Fund, 
and the SME Development TAF. The 
forms, including preferential bank loans, 
refundable and non-refundable grants, 
and interest subsidies, are available to 
companies registered in Hungary and 
awarded by competitive application and 
go mainly towards investment projects, 
small business, underdeveloped regions, 
environmental protection and R and D 
investment. They normally cover 30 per 
cent of investment costs, with a ceiling 
of HUF 200 million. 
Table 2 
State subsidies in 1997–2002 as a percentage of GDP 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Consumer subsidies 0.6 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.70 
Housing sector 0.79 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.51 
Producer subsidies 1.52 1.51 1.77 1.56 1.65 1.67 
Out of which: agri-
culture 0.96 0.84 1.02 0.84 0.92 0.80 
Total 2.91 2.75 2.93 2.71 2.81 2.88 
Source: CSO and own calculations.
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a. Targeted Allocation Fund for Economic 
Development (TAFED) 
Several application systems function un-
der the TAFED, which is administered by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (sup-
port for investment projects and domestic 
component supply, establishment of in-
dustrial parks, promotion of SMEs, etc.) 
The application system for economic de-
velopment is the main tool for promoting 
FDI. Investments to produce an annual 
output of more than HUF 50 million or 
establish at least 50 hotel rooms are eli-
gible. Projects must be completed in two 
years (those costing over HUF 3 billion 
in three years) and pay for themselves in 
local added value in five years. Invest-
ments meeting these requirements can 
obtain: 
* Interest-free loans of up to 25 per 
cent of investment cost with a ceiling 
of HUF 200 million (HUF 400 million 
for investment costs exceeding HUF 3 
billion). 
* For greenfield projects, non-refundable 
grants of up to HUF 200 million for 
up to 100 per cent of the costs of in-
stalling necessary infrastructure be-
yond the prem-
ises. 
Grants may be 
10 per cent higher 
– up to 27.5 per 
cent of investment 
costs, maxima of 
HUF 200 or 400 
million – for pro-
jects in regions des-
ignated as in the 
least developed cate-
gory and for par-
ticipants in the sup-
plier target pro-
gramme. The sum 
of all grants from the TAFED and other 
state funds may not exceed 50 per cent 
of investment costs. The application sys-
tem is built on a principle of national 
treatment and does not give preference 
to foreign investors. However, the signifi-
cant own-capital requirement has meant 
that the interest-free loans and grants 
have gone mainly to foreign investors in 
recent years. Table 3 shows the grants 
in 1998. Of the HUF 12 billion of funds 
applied for in 1999, HUF 8 billion were 
connected with foreign investors. The 
TAFED resources available in 2000 to-
talled HUF 17.2 billion. Grant strategy 
was affected by some changes in eco-
nomic policy. FDI promotion was joined 
as a main goal by introduction of mod-
ern technologies and products. Grants to 
foreign companies settling in Hungary 
should further their adaptation into the 
local economic environment and 
strengthen their ties to domestic suppliers 
and cooperation with other companies. In 
2000, 48 per cent of TAFED resources 
went to promote investment and the sup-
plier industry. Another 15 per cent went 
to collective investment and trade 
development, 6 per cent each to energy-
saving programmes, introduction of qual-
ity guarantee systems and individual 
trade-development projects, and 9 per 
cent to narrow the gap for counties in 
the worst economic situation and the 
most underdeveloped regions. 
Table 3
Grants of larger amounts in 1998, HUF millions 
 
Name of company Subject of development Grant Loan 
1. Caterpillar Hungary Expansion of capacity 0.00 180.00 
2. Curver Expansion of capacity 50.00 300.00 
3. Denso Hungary Fuel-injector pump production 200.00 200.00 
4. Ford Hungary Modular fuel-pump production 9.70 266.60 
5. GE Lighting Tungsram Halogen car-lamp development 0.00 200.00 
6. Luk Savaria  Clutch production plant 42.70 200.00 
7. Philips Monitor  Computer monitor production 0.00 200.00 
8. SCI Hungary Electronic assembly plant 112.40 287.60 
9. Sony Hungary Video apparatus production 0.00 200.00 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs. In: Antalóczy 2000. 
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b. Targeted Allocation Fund for Regional 
Development (TAFRD) 
The grants are supposed to narrow the 
gap between developed and underdevel-
oped regions and settlements and avert 
the development of further regions of 
economic crisis. The following regions 
are given high priority: 
* underdeveloped areas with below-
average economic and social indices, 
* regions of change in industrial struc-
ture, 
* regions of agricultural and regional 
development, and 
* regions with high rates of long-term 
unemployment. 
The forms of support are: 
* non-refundable grants, 
* refundable grants, and 
* grants connected with development 
loans. 
The upper limit on TAFRD grants 
for job creation is HUF 1 million per 
new job. Interest subsidies may not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the total interest on 
a loan. With investment projects creating 
over 50 new jobs and producing inter-
nationally competitive products, at least 
50 per cent the upper limit of grants 
awarded can be exceeded by 10 per 
cent and the upper grant limit per new 
job by HUF 500,000. Programmes eligi-
ble for TAFRD are: 
* job-creating investments, 
* productive infrastructure investments 
(installation of energy, traffic, water 
and sewage systems, communications, 
or disposal of regional waste), 
* EU-supported development projects, 
* innovation projects, 
* development of entrepreneurial zones, 
industrial parks and incubator houses, 
* development projects involving several 
counties. 
c. The Labour Market Fund 
The aim is job creation for long-term 
unemployed, in regions where employ-
ment is a big problem, and encourage-
ment for businesses to create competitive 
jobs. The scale of eligible grants – re-
fundable or non-refundable interest and 
capital subsidies – is determined case by 
case by labour-market centres. 
d. Support for R and D development 
The Commission for Technical Develop-
ment launched and several ministries 
supported an incentive for projects cost-
ing at least HUF 500 million and em-
ploying at least 30 researchers in R and 
D research institutions connected with 
high technology. The support may not 
exceed 25 per cent of the amount in-
vested. Bulk of state aid is provided 
through tax allowances, the preferred 
tool of poorer nations, rather than as 
direct cash transfers. Instead of redis-
tributing current income, the state gives 
away future potential income. This is an 
important advantage for companies, es-
pecially for large multinationals, which 
can transfer pre-tax income globally 
through various channels. Exemption 
from corporate income tax in Hungary, 
for example, moved profits from many 
other locations, thus boosting the tax-
holiday element in Hungarian state statis-
tics on aid. An officially acknowledged 
example has been Audi. The German 
carmaker announced that 80 per cent of 
its worldwide profits had been ‘pro-
duced’ in Hungary in 2001. The many 
highly ‘profitable’ Hungarian multination-
als add huge amounts of latent, unreal-
ized corporation tax to Hungary’s aid 
records. The main possibilities of receiv-
ing tax allowances in Hungary during 
1995-2001 were the following (these in-
centives were available until 2001, but 
already obtained allowances remain in 
effect until expiration). 
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a. General tax allowances for investment 
A 50 per cent tax allowance became 
available on January 1, 1996 for invest-
ment projects aiming to establish produc-
tion facilities, valued at a minimum of 
HUF 1 billion over a period of five tax 
years, provided those years saw: 
* net sales growth over the previous tax 
year of at least 5 per cent of the in-
vestment value, or 
* net sales at the level attainable if net 
sales had grown annually in that way. 
The same tax allowance was made 
available for investments to establish ho-
tel facilities commenced after December 
31, 1996 and valued at a minimum of 
HUF 1 billion, for a period of five tax 
years, in which: 
* net sales grow by at least 25 per 
cent, but at least HUF 600 million 
over the previous tax year, or: 
* net sales reach attainable level if net 
sales had grown annually in that way. 
A company received the full the 
full allowance for 10 tax years at pro-
ductive facilities established for at least 
HUF 10 billion after December 31, 1996, 
in tax years in which: 
* net sales increased over the previous 
year by at least 5 per cent of the in-
vestment value, or: 
* net sales reached the level attainable if 
net sales had grown annually in that 
way. 
The tax allowance was available 
only from the second year after start-up, 
when the average number of employees 
exceeded by at least 500 persons the 
number of employees in the year preced-
ing commencement of the investment 
project. 
b. Regional tax preferences 
Regional tax preferences are available 
for productive investments or for invest-
ments establishing hotel facilities in high 
priority regions and/or industrial parks. 
* Entities in a high priority region 
and/or entrepreneurial zone, produc-
ing new products or providing hotel 
facilities, are entitled to full exemption 
for five years after start-up, provided 
net revenue from new production in 
such a zone increases by at least 1 or 
5 per cent of investment value respec-
tively. 
* Investments in an underdeveloped re-
gion with a minimum value of HUF 3 
billion, begun after December 31, 
1996, and are entitled to exemption 
for 10 tax years after start-up, pro-
vided net revenues from new produc-
tion increases by at least 5 per cent 
of investment value and the workforce 
increases by at least 100 over the 
number in the year before com-
mencement. 
* A tax preference of 6 per cent of 
investment is available in the year 
when the investment facility opens, for 
companies operating: 
• in a high-priority region, on the 
value of machinery installed, 
• in an entrepreneurial zone, on the 
value of machinery installed and 
premises built, and 
• in a high-priority region or entre-
preneurial zone, on the value of in-
frastructure installed. 
c. Tax allowances to stimulate R and D 
activity 
A tax allowance of 20 per cent of di-
rect costs (developers’ direct salaries plus 
contributions, materials, semi-finished and 
finished products, intellectual products, 
purchased patents and know-how, licence 
fees, expert fees) in a tax year is given 
for R and D. 
Budget funds are partly decentral-
ized. Much of the TAFRD goes to local 
government, but there are transfers from 
other funds to at least five developed 
counties in Hungary. 
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The percentages are much lower 
than in Tables 1–2. There was certainly 
a great drop in subsidization, but it re-
sults from method changes. Figures in 
Table 4 are comparable with EU stan-
dards, but reflect only a fraction of 
state aid provided for various economic 
and social aims or to non-profit organi-
zations and local government, which was 
done in a large number of cases. More-
over, agriculture and fishing are not in-
cluded. About 1 per cent of GDP went 
to manufacturers in the form of state 
aid. Roughly 0.5 per cent of GDP helped 
to finance the transport sector, mainly 
Hungarian State Railways. 
After the usual EU breakdown of 
subsidy goals, it is possible to discern 
main groups: horizontal, sectoral and 
regional. Of the horizontal 
goals, TVI distinguishes R and 
D, environment, SME develop-
ment, employment, and educa-
tion/training. Of the many in-
dustries eligible for EU aid, only 
Hungary’s steel industry is af-
fected. It is also important that 
many winning projects featured 
two or more goals. In general, 
the projects were ordered ac-
cording to main goal. Table 5 
gives manufacturing data bro-
ken down in this way. 
Two interesting changes 
can be observed in this table, 
both occurring in 1998. First, 
bail-outs and restructuring ceased. This 
does not mean, that intermediaries of the 
state also stopped such activities. It 
means that no large-scale intervention 
was made after that time. In fact, both 
the 14.7 per cent and 2.9 per cent fig-
ures refer to steel-industry subsidies. 
There was only one major rescue later, 
of the Postabank, which has been re-
ferred to already, but it was a 2001 
case and not a manufacturing case, so 
that it does not appear in this table. 
Furthermore, general sectoral aid was in 
decline, although there was a jump in 
1997. It seems, that in the longer run, 
most aid was provided on a regional 
basis (the vast majority is tax allowance), 
while projects that cost real money ac-
counted for only 10 per cent of total aid 
Table 4
State aid provided to economic units 
(million Euros) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total aid, of which 577.7 765.0 836.8 689.0 800.1 800.5 
• Manufacturing 336.1 509.3 523.2 375.9 479.2 442.1 
• Transportation 220.9 223.5 290.3 291.3 304.1 276.5 
• Coal mining 20.7 32.2 23.3 16.1 12.6 16.2 
Total aid as percentage of GDP 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Per capita aid (Euros) 56.5 75.2 82.6 68.3 80.0 80.0 
Aid per employee (Euros) 152.7 209.8 226.3 180.9 207.9 N/A 
Aid as a percentage of central 
budget expenditures 3.28 3.80 4.01 3.26 3.44 N/A 
Source: TVI, 2002, p.12. 
Table 5 
State aid for manufacturing companies broken 
down to purpose of the aid 
(%) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Horizontal aid 
• R and D support 
• Environment 
• SME development 
• Employment 
• Education, training 
13.2 
1.5 
1.2 
4.0 
4.2 
0.3 
15.8 
1.8 
4.7 
3.7 
3.3 
0.3 
12.8 
1.6 
4.8 
4.4 
1.0 
0.0 
8.2 
0.6 
4.7 
2.8 
0.0 
0.0 
9.3 
1.0 
3.6 
4.6 
0.0 
0.0 
Rescue and restructuring 14.7 2.9 0 0 0 
Sectoral aid 3.7 14.3 5.2 1.9 0 
Regional aid 68.4 67.0 82.0 89.9 90.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: TVI, 2002, p.17. 
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in horizontal projects. According to TVI 
(2002), the amount of tax allowances 
increased from 200 million Euros to 360 
million over the 1996–2000 period, while 
direct aid to manufacturing grew from 
40 million Euros to 70 million. Sectoral 
programmes were gradually eliminated 
as the privatization process drew to a 
close. No special programmes accessible 
to whole industries remained available in 
Hungary. The elimination of employment 
and education aid in horizontal aid 
shifted the emphasis onto supporting in-
dividuals and onto new, generally acces-
sible, not aid-like tools. 
The structure of aid hardly 
changed in 1996–2000. Non-refundable 
subsidy and tax allowances were the 
most important forms (95 per cent), but 
direct cash subsidies lost significant 
weight to tax allowances. Ad hoc aid 
also lost importance. In 1996, almost 20 
per cent (63.9 million Euros) of total 
manufacturing aid was channelled 
through the privatization agency as ad 
hoc aid, but by 2000, there was no 
Hungarian ad hoc aid officially regis-
tered. All official aid was 
distributed through aid 
programmes. 
Local governments 
support business ventures 
through several channels. 
Cash subsidies and tax al-
lowances counted as offi-
cial aid under Article 62 
of the European Agree-
ment. Tax allowances have 
been collected by the Aid 
Control Office of the Min-
istry of Finance since 1999. 
Reporting of cash subsidies started in 
2002. The amounts and relative share of 
allowances are not high, but still signifi-
cant, as Table 7 shows. 
SOME METHODOLOGICAL     
ISSUES 
Many intrinsic and formal inconsistencies 
in state aid practice and monitoring in 
Hungary have been mentioned. In fact, 
the system is under development and full 
convergence cannot be expected to fol-
low EU entry, as many tax allowances 
obtained earlier will remain until agree-
ments expire, making the effective sub-
sidization practice different from the EU 
standard. Full convergence can be ex-
pected by the end of the decade.  
Most important here is the absence 
of consolidation of aid sources. There 
are two main state-controlled institutions 
carrying out activities that may influ-
ence competition and competitiveness. 
These are not monitored effectively by 
the State Aid Control Office. These are 
the State Privatization and Asset Hold-
ing PLC (ÁPV), and the Hungarian De-
velopment Bank. Both institutions served 
as corporations, have legal personality, 
but carry out active role in the execu-
tion of the policies of the Hungarian 
Government. The monitoring is difficult, 
Table 6 
State aid for manufacturing firms broken 
down by aid categories 
(%) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Non refundable subsidy 34.28 25.05 22.33 12.46 18.36 26.29
Tax allowance 58.76 58.28 72.90 76.21 76.82 71.04
Interest subsidy 1.46 2.87 0.71 1.84 1.41 0 
Equity share 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Interest free loan 2.86 4.60 3.60 7.58 2.01 0.39 
Guarantee 2.64 9.20 0.46 1.90 1.41 2.28 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: TVI, 2002, p.20. 
Table 7 
Tax allowances on local business tax provided 
by local government, million Euros 
 
 1999 2000 
Total local tax revenue 785 857 
Revenues from local business tax 678 725 
Tax holidays on local business tax 48 42 
Source: TVI, 2002, p.26. 
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because their state controlled functions 
are mixed with ordinary commercial ac-
tivities. On the other hand, they also 
may use their revenues for cross-
financing different projects. This means, 
that potential state budget revenues are 
used in these two organizations for vari-
ous purposes, including subsidizing. Since 
the revenues are not transferred to the 
budget or redistributed formally, they 
are not fully included in aid statistics 
either. This is especially the case with the 
Hungarian Development Bank, which is 
relatively independent of the state. The 
privatization agency is more strictly con-
trolled and monitored by the government 
and Parliament, and reports on the 
structure of its spending, which is in-
cluded in the Aid Control Office reports 
as well.  
This inconsistency was also stressed 
in one of its fiscal transparency report 
by the IMF (2001). This referred to ‘in-
consistencies in terms of incomplete cov-
erage of non-profit organizations that 
perform governmental functions,’ and 
‘exclusion of the Motorway Co. Ltd and 
the Hungarian Privatization and State 
Holding Company from the central gov-
ernment.’ The governmental segment of 
the non-profit sector includes 36 public 
trust funds (foundations established by 
Parliament, government or local govern-
ment) and 
about 100 
public-service 
companies 
(publicly 
owned corpo-
rate vehicles to 
provide public 
services such 
as road main-
tenance or 
transportation 
under contract 
from ministries 
or local gov-
ernment au-
thorities). Ac-
cording to the 
IMF report, budget spending through 
these agencies amounts to less than 1 
per cent of the total. The Motorway Co. 
Ltd. is a joint-stock company, wholly 
owned by the Hungarian Development 
Bank, that undertakes road building on 
behalf of the government and is financed 
ultimately by the budget, albeit via the 
Hungarian Development Bank through a 
variety of means. Before 2000, financing 
of road construction was provided di-
rectly through the state budget. The ÁPV 
was taken out of the budget in 1996 
and its financial operations are currently 
recorded in the fiscal accounts only inso-
far as it pays dividends and part of the 
proceeds of privatization to the budget 
or receives budget transfers. The latter 
transfers are also recorded by the Aid 
Control Office.  
Hungary has substantially reduced 
its ownership of commercial firms. Its 
holdings are currently concentrated in 
electric power transmission, the country’s 
one nuclear power station, public trans-
port, and state forests and farms. The 
government has also retained a limited 
number of ‘golden shares’ in telecommu-
nications, banking, energy, and other 
activities. However, a number of public 
financial institutions and non-financial 
public enterprises are required to under-
take non-commercial activities on the 
Table 8
Aid-like expenditures by the ÁPV, HUF million, current prices 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Reorganization of firms 9792 15670 16498 13458 14978 6585 3941 1689
Environmental clean-up     4480 3973 2468 1191 
Other liabilities (e.g. due 
guarantees) 3647 8222  1162 1500 4471 5030 272 
Transfers for various 
development projects 241 13000 8000 13500 8500 10000   
Debtor consolidation  81 12000 219     
Emergency payment due 
to privatization    52702     
Total 13680 36973 36498 81041 29458 25029 11439 3152 
Note: The table combines expenditures formally financed by firms controlled by the 
ÁPV or by asset sales and expenditures financed out of the ÁPV budget. 
Source: ÁPV. 
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state’s behalf, typically in infrastructure, 
agriculture, housing, foreign trade and 
health care. Support for such non-
commercial operations is provided either 
directly from the budget by the ÁPV or 
by issuing government guarantees. The 
Hungarian Development Bank is required 
by a government resolution to participate 
in development of the state infrastruc-
ture, financing of SME support projects, 
and other state initiated projects. With 
the first, the bank provides financing for 
the Motorway Co. Ltd, for instance. The 
government in turn guarantees credits 
extended by the bank for road construc-
tion and is required by another govern-
ment resolution to provide regular capi-
tal injections to the Development Bank, 
drawn in part from the budget and in 
part from the ÁPV. IMF (2001) argues 
that such complex financial manoeuvres 
are not readily transparent or under full 
aid control. 
The annual reports of the ÁPV can 
be used to assess its financing role. Ta-
ble 8 contains some details of this. As 
the IMF report pointed out, transactions 
in which the ÁPV takes part are not 
quite transparent and it has only been 
possible to guess at which items in the 
annual reports are likely to have had an 
aid content. The figures by no means 
reflect specific additional amounts to the 
official data. They simply illustrate the 
trends. Two are obvious. First, aid 
through the ÁPV was most widespread 
when there was a lot of privatization 
revenue coming in. Until 1996, the bulk 
of the revenue was collected by the state 
budget and relatively little used through 
the ÁPV for aid purposes. Reorganization 
and transfers to other development pro-
jects were the major aid means. Substan-
tial amounts were also paid out for state 
guarantees. 
In 1996–8, the ÁPV participated in 
the debt consolidation programme, which 
had a 100 per cent aid content. In 
1998, there was a major transfer la-
belled in the report as ‘emergency pay-
ment due to privatization’, but no fur-
ther details are known. ÁPV also began 
to finance environmental clean-up pro-
jects. Transfers to the central budget and 
to other state sponsored aid programmes 
dwindled as the privatization process 
drew to a close. In other words, lack of 
further privatization revenues curbed the 
ÁPV’s role as an aid dispenser. 
However, the ÁPV is still majority 
owner in a number of commercial ven-
tures. According to the figures, there 
were 37 firms in long-term state man-
agement in January 2003, with a com-
bined book value of HUF 260 billion (1 
billion Euros). The bulk of the value was 
accounted for by the Hungarian State 
Railways, Malév Hungarian Airlines and 
holdings in the energy sector. The state 
interest in manufacturing was minor. 
There was one major steelworks, but it 
was up for sale. There were 81 other 
companies still for sale, with a book 
value of HUF 137 billion. Some cross-
subsidization can be assumed in some 
cases, for available information suggests 
that the steelworks, for instance, ran at 
a loss in last two years, and so did the 
railways and the airline. 
Similar considerations apply to the 
state-owned Hungarian Development 
Bank. It has been mentioned already how 
the bank is involved in various state de-
velopment programmes. It also has inter-
ests in several manufacturing companies, 
through a portfolio that goes back to the 
debtor consolidation programme of 
1995–6. The bank itself was established 
to gather up the assets of ailing manu-
facturing companies that the government 
thought to have some national strategic 
importance, or that were better off than 
average. Thus the bank started life as a 
professional reorganizing body. After 
successful stabilization and reorganization 
of several companies, these were sold, 
but others could not be saved, so that 
the portfolio contracted to a handful of 
firms hardly viable without state support. 
The bank possessed equity in 55 com-
mercial companies, mostly in services or 
finance. The few in manufacturing were 
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important as single survivors in tradi-
tional activities such as handicrafts or 
traditional clay products.  
Table 9 shows the size and sectoral 
distribution of the state-owned sector in 
manufacturing. It can be interpreted as 
a guide to the sectoral distribution of 
state aid, as far as direct cash subsidies 
for state firms are concerned. In very 
few industries does the state share ex-
ceed 10 per cent. In branches 171, 201, 
241, 274, the state share declined due to 
privatization or liquidations. More sur-
prisingly, there were five branches (332, 
352, 354, 355 and 362) where the state 
sector expanded significantly: State firms 
are dominant only in 296 weapons and 
ammunition, 355 other non-specified ve-
hicles. 
 
Table 9 
Sectoral distribution of state-owned companies 
(% shares in production and employment of manufacturing industries) 
 
Sector 
(NACE 
3-digit groups) 
1998 
State output 
(sales)/total output 
(sales) *100 
1998 
State employ-
ment/total employ-
ment *100 
2001 
State output 
(sales)/total output 
(sales) *100 
2001 
State employ-
ment/total employ-
ment *100 
151 1.24 1.63 1.08 1.32 
152 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
153 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.61 
154 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.00 
155 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.87 
156 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.92 
157 1.62 4.91 0.95 0.92 
158 0.24 0.63 0.08 0.21 
159 1.11 3.06 0.11 0.12 
160 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
171 11.64 16.10 0.00 0.00 
172 7.88 1.30 0.00 0.04 
173 0.04 0.05 0.48 0.10 
174 4.57 19.19 5.51 5.26 
175 1.84 1.48 0.00 0.00 
176 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.13 
177 3.43 18.34 2.99 17.62 
181 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.00 
182 0.59 3.30 0.69 1.31 
183 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.25 
191 3.83 0.10 0.00 0.00 
192 2.54 15.31 0.00 0.00 
193 0.73 1.02 1.63 1.86 
201 8.70 10.09 2.73 4.55 
202 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
203 0.67 0.90 0.16 0.26 
204 0.03 0.03 9.19 4.88 
205 0.72 0.47 0.10 0.17 
211 0.00 0.00 1.20 5.59 
212 0.36 5.60 1.59 3.10 
221 3.31 5.12 5.73 1.25 
222 0.89 7.97 0.69 1.97 
223 4.65 7.38 12.98 12.33 
232 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
241 6.49 12.65 0.74 3.39 
242 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
243 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.12 
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Sector 
(NACE 
3-digit groups) 
1998 
State output 
(sales)/total output 
(sales) *100 
1998 
State employ-
ment/total employ-
ment *100 
2001 
State output 
(sales)/total output 
(sales) *100 
2001 
State employ-
ment/total employ-
ment *100 
244 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 
245 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
246 0.55 3.46 0.10 0.00 
247 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
251 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.09 
252 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.22 
261 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.12 
262 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.07 
263 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 
264 0.16 0.93 0.06 0.49 
265 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
266 0.12 0.16 0.81 2.19 
267 0.00 0.68 0.43 0.10 
268 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 
271 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
272 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
273 22.95 38.08 34.96 10.93 
274 19.58 19.84 0.00 0.00 
275 0.03 0.35 0.17 0.00 
281 3.40 2.55 0.43 0.27 
282 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.43 
283 0.07 0.07 9.31 6.28 
284 16.36 13.74 10.91 11.17 
285 0.51 0.52 2.92 1.09 
286 4.82 6.77 3.31 4.73 
287 0.50 0.43 0.10 0.16 
291 4.24 4.79 2.87 4.77 
292 1.69 2.36 1.28 0.27 
293 0.83 1.36 2.11 0.97 
294 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.07 
295 1.70 2.85 0.61 0.59 
296 98.19 96.04 45.73 57.12 
297 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
300 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.00 
311 0.58 0.89 0.31 0.23 
312 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 
313 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67 
314 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
315 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 
316 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.03 
321 0.49 1.48 0.28 0.01 
322 1.28 2.90 0.39 3.19 
323 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.03 
331 6.27 8.82 4.97 5.22 
332 0.19 0.24 5.81 6.01 
333 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.05 
334 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
335 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
341 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
342 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
343 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
351 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 
352 2.80 4.97 12.45 16.07 
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Sector 
(NACE 
3-digit groups) 
1998 
State output 
(sales)/total output 
(sales) *100 
1998 
State employ-
ment/total employ-
ment *100 
2001 
State output 
(sales)/total output 
(sales) *100 
2001 
State employ-
ment/total employ-
ment *100 
353 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
354 0.00 0.00 6.56 30.48 
355 0.00 0.00 50.43 53.74 
361 0.65 0.53 0.31 0.47 
362 0.27 0.95 23.41 5.14 
363 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
364 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
365 0.03 0.07 0.42 0.26 
366 4.47 25.93 4.15 6.84 
 
* * * * *
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